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Introduction 
 
The present paper aims to shed light on the emergence, within the European Union (EU), 
of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) in the field of pensions. This through the 
concept of window of opportunity (related to a revised ‘garbage can’ model). While that 
concept has been usually proposed for the analysis of agenda-setting and policy change 
(Keeler, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2003), here I use it for the study of the 
introduction of new modes of governance
2 (NMG) and to answer two more specific 
questions: why did Pensions OMC emerge? And how did it evolve? 
 
The proposed model seems useful for at least three reasons. Firstly, it allows for a multi-
dimensional and multi-level analytical framework. From a descriptive perspective, it 
provides a wide map of multiple socio-economic, institutional and political factors (some 
of them related to elements of chance and human creativity) which affected the launch of 
the coordination process in the field. These forces, originated both at national and supra-
national level, led to a window of opportunity and then to a NMG. From a theoretical point 
of view, this allows for the combination of some of the traditional theories of European 
integration (neo-functionalism, new institutionalism and intergovernmentalism). As 
Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 9) have argued, EU is ‘heavily nuanced, constantly changing 
and even kaleidoscopic’ and thus resists simple characterisations and/or a general theory. 
Consistently, the following framework draws on the interaction of different theories.
3 
Secondly, it helps to specify the mechanisms that translate critical junctures into lasting 
political legacies. The role of key political entrepreneurs in particular proves important to 
define problems, envisage solutions, and collecting consensus for a renewed EU 
intervention. In the following, we do reference to the Director General of the DG 
Employment and Social Affairs of the Commission, the then Belgian Minister Frank 
Vandenbroucke (one of the architecture of the OMC), and the Italian administrative elite. 
Finally, the use of a multi-dimensional and multi-level framework helps us to identify the 
main peculiarities of Pensions OMC, its emergence and first evolution (before the broader 
                                                 
1   This paper is the first result of the research carried out by the author for NEWGOV, a European research 
project financed by the 6
th Framework Programme of the European Commission. 
2   I refer to the definition of governance proposed by Peterson and Bomberg (1999): the imposition of 
overall direction or control on the allocation of valued resources. 
3   Vanhercke (2006a) talks of the need for theoretical ‘eclecticism’ in the analysis of European integration.   2
process of ‘streamlining’ with other social protection and inclusion OMC’s). While some 
of the factors mentioned above were determinants of the broader Lisbon Strategy, some 
others are typical of pensions policy. Their combination helps explain the peculiar 
‘weakness’ of the coordination process of national pension reforms (in terms of its 
convergence capacity). 
 
The first section briefly summarises the key steps for the launch and first implementation 
of Pensions OMC (in the period 1999-2003) and its peculiar traits. Section two introduces 
the multi-dimensional and multi-level framework based on the concept of window of 
opportunity. Sections three to five present the main socio-economic, institutional and 
political factors that led to the launch of the new method. Their interaction rather than their 
independence explain the launch of the OMC in the field. Section six concludes. 
 
1. The Open Method of Coordination on Pensions: A ‘weak’ and ‘light’ process 
 
According to the conclusions of the Lisbon Summit of 2000, the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) aims to organise a learning process about how to cope with the 
common challenges of the global economy in a co-ordinated way, while also respecting 
national diversity. It consists of defining common strategic guidelines at European level for 
coping with structural change and then organising a process whereby Member States 
emulate each other in applying them, stimulating the exchange of best practices, while 
taking account of national characteristics (European Council, 2000). Its main procedures 
are: common guidelines to be implemented at national level, periodic monitoring, 
evaluation and peer review accompanied by indicators and benchmarks. 
 
Forms of European coordination have developed over time. Already envisaged for budget 
policy under the Maastricht Treaty, they were then introduced for employment policy 
through the Amsterdam Treaty and for social inclusion and social protection (Scharpf, 
2002). In 1999, the Commission proposed the communication, ‘A concerted strategy for 
modernising social protection’ (CEC, 1999). In terms of policy goals, the report stressed 
that social protection institutions are at the core of the European Social Model. It proposed 
their modernisation to contribute to the economic competitiveness of Europe. In terms of 
procedures, the document indicated a number of instruments to improve the exchange of 
national expertise, the stricter cooperation between EU institutions, and for the 
involvement of key stakeholders at different levels of governance (supranational, national, 
and local). The key components of the OMC, in terms of both goals and procedures, were 
de facto already defined (de la Porte, 2003). 
 
Still in 1999, under the Finnish Presidency, the decision was taken to set up the High-level 
working group to tackle social protection issues common to all European members. This 
working group was then integrated and mentioned in the Nice Treaty as the Social 
Protection Committee (SPC). As requested by the Lisbon summit, the European 
Commission published a communication on ‘Safe and Sustainable Pensions’ at the end of 
2000. The Stockholm European Council of February 2001 made reference for the first time 
to the open method of coordination to be introduced in this domain, while the Goteborg 
Council of June 2001 endorsed the three broad objectives (or pillars) of the process. They 
were defined in terms of the need to grant the social adequacy, the financial sustainability, 
and the modernisation of pension programmes according to the changing social and 
economic conditions. In December, the Laeken Summit (under the Belgian Presidency) 
adopted the Joint Report on Objectives and Working Methods prepared by the SPC and the   3
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) with eleven sub-objectives (under the three objectives 
of social adequacy, financial sustainability and modernization), working methods and the 
timetable for the first ‘round’ of the process. Member states were invited to prepare the 
National Strategy Reports (NSR) about their national pension programmes for September 
2002. Then, the Commission and the Council had to present the Joint Report to summarise 
common trends in pension policy across the EU for March 2003 (see Vanhercke, 2006b for 
a more precise historical account). The next sections will seek to answer the following 
question: why did Pensions OMC emerge? 
 
If compared to other OMC’s (like the European Employment Strategy), Pensions OMC (at 
least as for its first years of implementation) has been defined a ‘partial’ (ibidem, 13) and 
‘closed’ method of coordination (Natali, 2006), in that: 
 
-  it lacks an explicit reference in the Treaty; 
-  common voluntary objectives are mainly qualitative; 
-  there are no explicit recommendations to member states, and thus neither formal 
nor moral sanctions; 
-  it lacks common indicators agreed on by member states (at least as for the first 
cycle of its implementation). 
-  participation of stakeholders (both social partners and social NGOs) has proved 
particularly limited in that there is no formal requirement for them to participate or 
to be consulted in the process; 
-  national strategy reports (NSR) represent a state of the art of pension programmes 
rather than an action plan for the future; 
-  benchmarking is very limited and the peer review process is weak (see Schludi, 
2003). 
 
As Citi and Rhodes (2007) put it, the coordination of pension programmes is thus 
characterised by a low ‘convergence capacity’. The two authors establish a single variable 
for locating different policy instruments, in terms of five discrete steps and calibrate the 
convergence capacity accordingly. Pensions OMC is included in step two (low 
convergence effects), in that is based on voluntary objectives plus weak forms of 
benchmarking and peer pressure. In other words, there is little room for learning and no 
fundamental alteration of the incentive structure of the national policy-making process 
(Eckardt, 2005). Moreover, as shown by de la Porte and Nanz (2004), it is characterised by 
low participation of social partners and civil society organizations and restricted room for 
public debate. 
The following sections seek to answer a second question: why is Pensions OMC such a 
‘light’ process of coordination (much weaker than that on employment and other social 
policies)? 
 
2.   The Emergence of New Modes of Governance: A multi-dimensional and multi-
level approach 
 
The literature on the launch of new modes of governance in the social policy domain has 
mainly focused on neo-functional,  inter-governmental, and new institutionalist theories. 
For neo-functionalists the emergence of social OMC’s is largely dependent on economic 
integration and the consequent loss of national capacity to promote social rights. First 
decisions related to economic integration (i.e. Single market, EMU) ‘spill over’ and 
provoke further acts of integration (in employment and social domain). Scharpf (2002) and   4
Ioannou and Niemann (2003) have followed that approach and stressed the importance of 
social and political demands for the advancement of social Europe and the technocratic 
process led by national governments and experts for the introduction of NMG. Neo-
functionalism has been criticized for ignoring the political rationality of the EU decision-
making; and for underestimating the potential for inefficiency and for stagnation in the 
European integration (Schafer, 2004). 
Neo-institutionalists have suggested the capacity of supranational institutions (once they 
are created) to define and pursue an autonomous set of preferences, basically to increase 
their control over the policy-making process. Gaps between national governments 
preferences and the functioning of supra-national institutions is thus determined by: 
autonomy of supra-national institutions, unintended consequence of integration, 
multiplicity of interests of actors taking office, restricted time horizon of decision makers. 
Institutional obstacles and costs limit the capacity of national institutions to react to 
‘agency losses’, while they increase power and competencies of supra-national actors (see 
Pierson, 1996a; Pollack, 1997; de la Porte, 2007). As argued by Vanhercke (2006a; 2006b), 
the introduction of the OMC on social protection seems to be related to the previous 
emergence of new governing modes on employment and then on social inclusion. On the 
one hand, the first OMCs represented a set of instruments easily adaptable to further policy 
domains. On the other, the Commission (on the base of the role played and on the 
capabilities matured in other policies), acted as a broker to aggregate consensus. New 
institutionalism has been criticized because of its inability to shed light on the persistent 
ability of national governments to chose different modes of integration with different 
degrees of delegation, to overestimate the impact of unintended consequences and costs 
(related to previous steps) on future decisions, and again because it underestimates the role 
of actor constellation (see Schafer, 2004). For inter-governmentalists, then, EU integration 
is mainly related to the interaction of member states. Governments are rational self-
interested actors which define their interests, aggregate social demands and negotiate 
between each other. The leftward electoral swing in the second part of the 1990s, the action 
of some members (i.e. Portugal and Belgium) and of new comers in the EU (i.e. Sweden), 
and a broad inter-governmental contributed to the launch of OMCs (Goetschy, 1999; 
Jenson and Pochet, 2002). Critics to this approach are mainly related to more open 
interaction between governments, supra-national institutions, and interest groups; as well as 
to the influence of international organisations on the definition of members’ interests and 
preferences (Vanhercke, 2006a). 
 
Moreover, the theories mentioned above have been the object of some broader and 
common critical remarks. First, as argued by Peterson and Bomberg (1999), their 
individual application to the EU integration shows some limits. Each one cannot represent 
by itself ‘the’ general theory for the understanding of the EU decision-making. This last is 
a complex and deep form of regionalism that resists simple generalizations (Sandholtz, 
1996). Second, as to their application to the emergence of new governing modes on social 
issues, it seems too generic and unable to deal with the peculiar traits of each process and 
its independent variables. The above-mentioned complexity of European integration has a 
‘policy-based’ dimension too. In line with the seminal work by Lowi (1964), key features 
of a certain policy have an influence on the political process (i.g. the logic of interaction, 
the nature of interests and preferences, etc). Further complication, decision-making is 
typically multi-level: supra-national and national level interact. Here, I do reference to the 
seminal work of Putnam (1988) on ‘two-level games’ based on the interaction of 
diplomacy (at supra-national level) and domestic politics (see also Scharpf, 1988). 
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In line with these broad remarks, the present section proposes a multi-dimensional and 
multi-level framework. This explains the emergence of a NMG in terms of the interaction 
of different variables leading to a window of opportunity and then innovation. More than a 
single independent variable, I understand the introduction of new modes of governance as 
the result of a number of factors, some of them identifiable and rationally explainable; 
some others imponderable (Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2003). Moreover, some operates at 
national level and some others at supra-national level. 
 
Opportunities for innovation are usually very low. Lock-in effects, the generally 
conservative features of democratic political institutions, and the risky nature of innovation 
represent decisive constraints on changes. By contrast, other phenomena may open 
windows representing an opportunity for advocates of proposals to give attention to some 
problems and consequently to adopt solutions. Despite their rarity, it is precisely these 
windows that affect major changes. Authors like Kingdon (1995) has used the ‘garbage 
can’ model to studying the fluidity of policy-making and the role played by elements of 
chance and human creativity. In fact, it recognises that political phenomena are irregular 
and highly influenced by very broad determinants. Fortuitous factors can play a decisive 
role in setting a certain issue at the core of the political debate. In a previous work, I have 
proposed a revised and more deterministic interpretation of the ‘policy change’ model 
(based on the concept of window of opportunity) to cope with its main shortcomings 
(Natali, 2004).
4 
 
The following framework is based on some key elements: socio-economic, political and 
institutional factors (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Window of opportunity for the emergence of governing
modes
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The first two are related to the problem and political ‘streams’ defined by Kingdon (1995). 
Political and socio-economic factors capture the attention of decision-makers by means of 
different elements as he describes. Indicators (such as the economic stagnation, or the 
                                                 
4  A vast debate has developed on vices and virtues of such an approach (see Mucciaroni, 1992: 461-7; 
Bendor et al. 2001: 184-7; Olsen, 2001: 191-4; Zahariadis, 2003). Some authors have pointed out the 
vagueness of the independent variables within the ‘policy change’ model (in particular in the seminal 
work by Kingdon, 1995) as its first limit (Mucciaroni, 1992; Bendor et al., 2001).   6
growing budget deficit) as well as focusing events (i.e. symbolic events, etc.) are able to 
call attention on problems. Moreover, other political  events (i.e. new public opinion 
climate, turnover of key political and administrative personnel) can enlarge or restrict the 
room to manoeuvre for innovation. 
Institutional factors seem particularly important in the analysis of the European 
integration. The emergence of forms of coordination of economic and budget policies has 
represented an important example to replicate in other areas through a dynamic of learning 
and mimicking (Pochet, 2001; Moreno and Palier, 2004). What is more, these institutional 
dynamics in a certain field can produce their effects on other policy areas (functional 
spillover effect). This is particularly true for pensions. Fiscal and monetary policy decisions 
have affected welfare problems directly (see Featherstone, 2004). Then, innovations are 
assumed to be the result of a process that includes more than a single episode. Actors’ 
behaviour and factors at time t influence events at time t+1. To sum up, socio-economic, 
political and institutional factors interact with each other and thus lead to a window of 
opportunity for the emergence of new governing modes. 
 
To clearly explain the logic of such a process, the model needs some further elaboration. 
Here, I claim that political entrepreneurs have an important role. These are individuals 
capable of producing unexpected changes and are characterised by energies and talent (see 
Zerbinati and Souitaris, 2002 for a review of the literature on policy entrepreneurship). Not 
only do they make use of a given window, but they also contribute to its opening. They 
couple solutions, problems, and political momentum (Kingdon, 1995). As argued in a 
previous work (Natali, 2004), I assume they have a more pro-active role. As the analysis of 
the emergence of the OMC confirms, not only do they make use of a given policy window, 
but they also contribute to its opening. The next sections will focus on few of their 
capabilities: the elaboration of strategic orientations (that are the definition of problems and 
proposals), and the commitment and control of resources (in particular, the maximisation of 
consensus for changes through diplomatic alliances) (Riker, 1986; Zahariadis, 2003).
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3.  Socio-economic Factors: Common Challenges to Pension Systems in Europe 
 
By the end of the 1970s, a number of economic and social pressures had placed social 
policies in general, and pensions in particular, under stress. Changes in the labour market, 
new family patterns, demographic strains and globalization were seen as severe constraints 
on social provisions (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). In line with the EU jargon, these challenges 
affected both the ‘financial sustainability’ and the ‘social adequacy’ of pensions (CEC and 
European Council, 2003). Since the 1980s, some publications (especially those from 
international organisations, like the OECD, 1988 and the World Bank, 1994), did start a 
vast debate at the level of both public opinion and political elites. In the following we just 
summarise some key aspects of the ‘pension problem’ at the end of the 20
th century. 
 
Population ageing has represented the first main source of increased tensions. It consists of 
three different but interrelated issues: the increase in life expectancy, the exit from the 
labour market of the so-called baby-boom generation (born between 1945 and 1965), and 
the huge reduction of birth rates. While old-age schemes, introduced between the end of 
the 19
th century and the beginning of the 20
th century, were directed to a minority of the 
population and benefits were paid for a short period, demographic changes have worsened 
                                                 
5  The present paper will focus on different types of entrepreneurs: political leaders, national and European 
high-level bureaucrats, and experts. I refer to interviews with key actors that participated to the  first 
elaboration of the EU strategies on social policy.   7
their financial viability. Already in the 1980s, international organisations projected a 
dramatic increase of public pension outlays as a result of demographic trends. A proposed 
by Schludi (2005), OECD (1988) calculations in the late 1980s proved the growing 
financial strains on old-age programmes. Public spending in the EU countries was 
expected to reach dramatic high levels in case of no reform: 35% of GDP in Italy, 30% in 
Germany, about 27% in France. These indicators highly contributed to put pensions’ 
cutbacks at the top of the (national and European) political agenda
6 (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 
2005). 
 
Growing financial strains have consisted of a second challenge. They are just partly 
explainable in terms of population ageing. Other dynamics have played a role. In some 
countries, in fact, pension schemes started to show financial instability well before the 
concrete impact of demography. Pressures have been the consequence of a more limited 
economic development of European countries (compared to the rapid growth in the first 
three decades after WW II). The maturation of the pension system contributed to put it 
under financial strains as well. This corresponded to the exit of a growing number of 
workers from the labour market, with the subsequent implementation of the more generous 
rule introduced earlier. The existence of large state budget deficits (and debts) were a 
further short-term pressure: being pensions partly financed out of the public budget 
(Schludi, 2005). 
The evolution of labour markets and societal institutions (e.g. family) put old-age 
programmes under siege too. Pension systems were mainly directed to protect long-term 
contract jobs, stable and long careers, and based on full employment. Stable family 
structures that provided care for elderly and other dependent groups were the norm in the 
social structure (in particular in continental and southern Europe). In the second part of the 
20
th century, families started to change their profile and thus weaken the functional link 
between social policy in action and social needs. While, labour markets have been 
characterised by the increased importance of flexible contracts (e.g. temporary and part-
time jobs). Subsequent ‘new’ social risks have imposed the revision of ‘old’ programmes 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
 
In such a socio-economic context, European integration have represented a double threat 
for national welfare state (and especially for pension systems). On the one hand, the 
widening of the internal market have led to more open financial markets and capital 
mobility and thus reduced the capacity of national governments to increase taxation 
(Bonoli 2003). If the level of taxes is perceived as being too high by investors, they may 
decide to move their activities. This pressure is assumed to be particularly acute for 
countries where pensions are financed through contributions and general taxation. On the 
other, and consistently, monetary union and the coordination of budget policies have 
greatly reduced the capacity of Member States to control exchange rates and budget deficit. 
This leads us to the institutional factors that contributed to open the window of 
opportunity. To sum up, both socio-economic pressures at national level and European 
integration were consistent with the strength of EU steering capacity in the field. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6  The former EU commissioner Fritz Bolkenstein used the label ‘pensiontime bomb’ to describe the 
foreseeable problems on the financial viability of pension programmes (Bolkenstein, 2001). This can be 
interpreted as a focusing event that contributed to the dramatisation of pension problems.   8
4.  Institutional Factors: European Integration vs. National Welfare States 
 
While socio-economic strains concerned all western countries, EU members faced 
reinforced pressures. As Scharpf (2002) and then Ferrera (2006) put it, the EU has been 
based on a political and constitutional asymmetry between economic and social policy 
functions. The latter is designed at national level in the shadow of the ‘constitutionalized’ 
European law on market integration and liberalization. In line with neo-functionalism, 
economic integration is assumed to ‘spill over’ and provoke the demand for further 
integration in social policy domains through societal and technocratic processes (see 
Ioannou and Nieman, 2003). In line with a functionalist perspective, common challenges to 
the ‘golden age’ pension programmes forced member states to react, but European 
integration limited their capacity to find solutions. Both elements were consistent with 
some more active form of EU intervention. 
 
At the end of the 20
th century, at the European level the ‘pension issue’ was not new. Since 
its emergence, the EU has dealt with it according to different (but complementary) 
dimensions (European Council, 2000). The first axis of intervention concerns the 
development of integrated, transparent and efficient financial markets. by eliminating 
obstacles to investments in supplementary pension funds. Here, the EU has acted through 
the legislative or community method
7. As Borras and Jacobsson (2004) put it, that attempt 
to harmonise individual and collective rights has reached its limits. More precise issues 
related to the functioning of national programmes could be just partially touched by the 
European legislation, while more effective measures could not be imposed to single 
members. 
 
The second action aims to face population ageing through the co-ordination of macro-
economic policy (and especially of budget policies). In that sense, the Maastricht Treaty 
and then the Stability and Growth Pact and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines have 
represented the main instruments of action. As mentioned above, during the 1990s, 
national governments were forced to leave the budget-spending paradigm in favour of a 
more restricted financial policy. Limits to public pensions, from the Maastricht Treaty and 
then the Stability and Growth Pact, largely contributed to cutbacks (Pakaslahti and Pochet, 
2003). That coordination has represented a twofold stimulus for a more explicit EU action 
on social policies. On the one hand, it led to the acceleration of the European debate on 
social issues (where socially-oriented actors were initially excluded). As stressed by 
Hemerijck and Ferrera (2004: 251), by the 1990s employment and social policies had 
begun to find their way onto the European agenda. On the other hand, it represented 
according to the proposal by J. Delors, a template for a similar soft governance on social 
issues (see Ross, 1995; Pochet, 2001). Empirical evidence shows the active role of EU 
institutions (i.e. the Commission) in pressing member states to use the OMC to tackle the 
coordination of national pension reforms (see Vanhercke, 2006b). This confirms the new-
institutionalist perspective can help assessing the complex inter-governmental but also 
inter-institutional dynamic of the EU. 
 
While these supra-national dynamics were all favourable to the coordination of pensions, 
they were contrasted by other strong pressures at member states level. Despite the demands 
for more social Europe, national governments have traditionally been reluctant in 
                                                 
7  Some directives and rules traced the European discipline of public and private pension programmes. 
Between them, the rule 1612/68 related to the supplementary pension rights of migrant workers, and the 
rule 1408/71 on rights from social security programmes on trans-border workers (Pochet, 2003).   9
transferring to the EU their responsibility. Tackling pensions’ problems means engaging 
with what Pierson (1996b; 2001) has called an ‘immovable object’: welfare (and in 
particular pension) programmes are still sticky entities. First, electoral incentives are huge. 
Virtually every citizen (current pensioners and future beneficiaries as well) has a stake in 
public (and to a lower extent in non-public) pensions. Support for current pension 
programmes thus remains intense and creates potentially strong opposition to reforms as 
well as to the EU challenge to national autonomy. As shown by Ferrera (2006: 105), 
national institutions represent the main source of solidarity throughout the social structure 
and of strong political bonds between citizens and policy-makers, through the mediation of 
political parties and interest groups. If this is true for welfare schemes in general, pensions 
are the most expensive and thus popular programme by far: in 2003, pension outlays (for 
old-age, disability and survivors) represented more than 50% of total social spending in the 
EU-25 (Natali, 2006). 
 
Second, lock-in effects further reinforce the stability of existing national pension 
institutions: multiple vetoes and mechanisms of path dependence make certain courses of 
action once initiated hard to reverse. Again, this is particular true for pension arrangement 
which are mature and thus consistent with increasing returns (Pierson, 2001). I argue these 
impediments to innovation have been active against the uploading of responsibilities to the 
EU. For instance, the degree of institutional diversity with respect to pension systems is 
somewhat higher than in the case of other social policies (Schludi, 2003: 42). In fact, if the 
diversity of national welfare states is a traditional trait of the European social dimension, 
they are particularly huge in the field under scrutiny. Normative assumptions about what a 
pension system is and what is it expected to perform differ with consequences on the 
definition of common objectives and indicators.
8 
 
Third, pension programmes had mainly developed at national level. Key actors (political 
institutions and actors, and social partners) in the field are mainly national, while supra- 
and sub-national players are traditionally weak. National and European NGO’s which exert 
so much influence in other OMC’s (i.e. on social inclusion) are absent from the domain of 
pensions (see Vanhercke, 2006a; 2006b). Thus, the number of stakeholders interested in 
the field is much more limited and the room for an EU-level network (of organised 
interests) is reduced as well. 
 
The combination of the three factors seems to limit the room for an effective European 
intervention in the domain and thus to reduce the dimension of the window for a NMG. It 
is not surprising that member states have not accepted transfers of sovereignty to the EU 
level (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2002). 
 
5.  Political Factors and the Role of National and European Entrepreneurs 
 
Common challenges to national pension programmes and the progress of the European 
integration contributed to put pensions at the core of a large European debate. Other factors 
should however be addressed to improve the knowledge of how those pressures led to the 
emergence of the OMC (see Figure 1). This section focuses on political events that at the 
end of the 1990s favoured the launch of new modes of governance on pensions. Then, we 
focus on the role of political entrepreneurs, both within the EU institutions and single 
member states. As to the former, we do reference to the key role of actors in the DG 
                                                 
8   See Cornilleau et al (2003) about the problems dealt with by EU technical bodies for the definition of 
common objectives and indicators for pensions.   10
Employment and Social Affairs. As to the latter, we refer to national political decision 
makers and administrative elites in two countries. We consider Belgium and Italy as part of 
the coalition that favoured the launch of the Pensions OMC. 
 
As far as political events are concerned, the existence of left-of-centre governments in the 
major part of EU countries at the end of the 1990s (e.g. in the biggest countries, like 
France, Germany, Italy, and UK), was a truly stimulus that contributed to open a window 
of opportunity (Jenson and Pochet, 2002). According to the intergovernmental approach 
briefly summarised in Section 1, this represented a major political event consistent with the 
turn-over of the key political personnel in Europe. Mass protest movements in some 
countries (e.g. France and Italy) did show a mounting critique to the proposed reforms of 
welfare programmes, and the fear of new attacks (in the shadow of EMU) to social rights 
‘as we know them’. High-spending on pensions and the (electoral and political) costs of 
reforms were at the top of the political debate in many countries as well. The rise of centre-
left governments was largely interpreted as the effort to put employment and social 
policies at the top of both national and European agendas (Palier, 2003). As confirmed by 
the actors that at that time worked on this dossier, the shared understanding on the need for 
innovation was decisive to launch the OMC in social protection: 
 
“all the governments were conscious of the need for reforming pensions across 
Europe. At the same time, the fact that in a majority of countries left-of-centre 
governments ruled, favoured a common position to define a new ‘compromise’ 
between pressures for changes and the re-statement of key principles of the 
European social model’ (Interview Member of the Cabinet of the Belgian Minister 
of Social Affairs 2000, Brussels, 8 February 2005). 
 
In the words of Hemerijck and Ferrera (2004: 274), ‘the social democratic moment’ of the 
1990s defined social protection as a productive factor and helped to resurface the social 
dimension of the Union. Yet, social democratic leadership was much more ambiguous 
about the concrete uploading of competences on social protection (as well as on 
employment) policy. As argued by Schafer (2004, 12), ‘there has never been as strong a 
coalition in favour of internationalizing employment (and social) policy as there was in 
Maastricht for monetary union’. This is even more true for pensions (see the previous 
section). On the contrary, new modes of governance were accepted in that they represented 
neo-voluntarist soft methods, combining EU action with subsidiarity and flexibility. Here 
again, multiple forces ‘clashed’ with each other and pushed into different if not opposite 
directions. 
 
5.1  The Role of the Commission 
 
Thus, the ‘conflict’ between opposite forces, some favourable to EU coordination and 
some others against it, did limit the opportunity for a concrete action. Political 
entrepreneurs highly contributed to create the window of opportunity and then used it to 
launch the coordination of national pension reforms. Between the Lisbon Summit of 2000 
and the European Council of Stockholm in 2001, the interaction of some of these actors 
was decisive. The Director general for Employment and Social Affairs of the Commission 
was particularly active to address pensions and to envisage the introduction of the OMC 
process in this field too. 
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“the role of the DGV was decisive to put the interest on pensions and introduce 
the OMC method on this issue as well. In 2000, governments shared the idea to 
put two issues at the core of the Social Agenda: fight against social exclusion 
(through the OMC process) and the modernization of social protection schemes 
through the reform of the Rule 1408/71. Odile Quintin (High-level servant of 
DGV) in a meeting with the Belgian Minister Vandenbroucke, before the Belgian 
Presidency of the EU, stressed the need to implement an autonomous OMC for 
pensions policy” (Interview Member of the Cabinet of the Belgian Minister of 
Social Affairs 2000, Brussels, 8 February 2005, see also Vanhercke, 2006b). 
 
As introduced above, the first European reports on old-age programmes came from the 
economic actors, like the Ecofin Council and its technical bodies. What is more, after the 
Maastricht Treaty, economic ministers were particularly active in promoting cutbacks to 
social protection programmes to grant the present and future viability of public budget. As 
put it by Pochet (2003), socially-oriented institutions (the DG on Social Affairs and its 
Director general in particular) reacted to the risk to be isolated and to play a residual role in 
the process. 
The contribution by Mrs. Quintin at the occasion of the Conference ‘Towards A New 
Welfare Architecture for Europe?’, organised under the Belgian Presidency in 2001, 
clearly exemplified her approach to the ‘pension problem’ and what role the EU should 
play. She stressed two lessons to draw from the debate on reforms across Europe, both 
implicitly related to the launch of a European coordination: 
- policy makers should have to learn from each other, in that they share the same 
objectives (building solid pension schemes), face the same problems (the imbalance 
between active and inactive part of the population), and comply with the same rules 
(sound public finances and high-level social protection); 
- policy makers should have talk to other ‘professionals who also play a role in making 
(pensions) buildings safe. That means the need for cross interaction between different 
policy areas (e.g. employment and public finances) (see also Quintin, 2002). 
 
Hence, the Director general did influence the strategic orientations of key actors in the 
European political game (first of all national leaders) for the definition of the (pensions) 
problem and the solution to cope with it. 
 
5.2  The Role of Single Member States: the case of Belgium and Italy 
 
The Belgian Minister for Social Affairs and Pensions, Frank Vandenbroucke, favoured the 
introduction of a form of co-ordination on pensions as well (Vanhercke, 2006b). He was 
particularly active in influencing strategic orientations of other actors. At the beginning of 
this section we have shown that political leaders, expression of left-of-centre governments, 
had a two-fold aim. They proved particularly sensitive to both the reinforcement of the 
social dimension of Europe and to modernise it through reforms. At the same time, the EU 
could provide an exogenous constrain to justify innovations consistent with the goals 
mentioned above (see Featherstone, 2004). With reference to Belgium, for instance, 
pensions was a debated issue at the end of the 1990s: 
 
“The (Belgian) Minister took into consideration a new legislative intervention at 
the national level. To do it, a new rhetoric able to enlarge the social consensus 
for reforms was needed. To do that, it was important to mobilise social actors 
(especially trade unions) and the public opinion in general on some key issues:   12
for instance, on early retirement, and the low level of employment rates 
(especially between the older part of the population) in Belgium. the goal was to 
stress the opportunity to combine traditional objectives of the socialist party (in 
terms of adequacy of social protection) and the need for its financial 
sustainability. In that context, the efforts from the DG V were warmly welcome” 
(Interview with the then Member of the Cabinet of the Belgian Minister of Social 
Affairs in 2000; Brussels, 8 February 2005). 
 
The Belgian Minister was engaged on European social advancements since 1999, when in 
the case of a speech at the University of Amsterdam, he proposed his own interpretation of 
the concept of active welfare state, consistent with the New Labour’s project for a positive 
welfare. That label was related to the redefinition of both national welfare policies and the 
European project in a broader sense (see Cassiers et al., 2005). Given his personal mixed 
background (that of political leader and academics), he was able to play a crucial role in 
advancing the scientific elaborations and the EU politics on social policy as well (and the 
strategic orientation of the other actors). 
 
In 2001, he took the initiative for enlarging the support for, and the room for 
implementation of, the OMC. While a complex diplomatic game tried to enlarge the 
opportunity for the rapid introduction of the method for social protection, the Belgian 
Presidency of the EU organised three different conferences: the first one in September in 
Anthwerp on social inclusion, the second one in November in Leuven on social protection, 
and the third in December in Ghent on healthcare (Berghman and Okma, 2002). In 
particular, the competent Minister prepared the conference on social protection through the 
launch in 2000 of the proposal of four scientific reports (from noted academics)
9. These 
contributions should allow for the definition of a ‘new architecture’ of social protection 
systems. The preparation led to a more precise focus on pensions and the European 
procedures to introduce about them. At that time, the role of the Belgian Presidency was 
particularly important, view that the concrete implementation of the decisions of Lisbon on 
pensions was still a work-in-progress (ibidem, 422). 
In the closing note of that conference, Vandenbroucke (2001 and 2002: 534-535) stressed 
that the Open Method of Coordination represented an effective instrument for social 
progress and a credible commitment to a social Europe. On the base of the experts’ reports, 
the Minister then summarised some of the key aspects of pensions policy (and politics) to 
be considered through the new coordination. First, the demographic problem was defined 
as one of ‘an increasing share of spending’. From this perspective, it makes no difference 
whether these expenditures are accounted for within public budget or not. Consequently, 
the issue was not limited to the adequacy and viability of the first pillar, but to that of the 
non-public pillars too. A new emphasis was thus focused on the potential inter-
generational conflict and the need to consider present and future spending in terms of 
social justice (and not only of financial sustainability). The OMC could help to address all 
these challenges through the exchange of reliable information, the implementation of 
dynamics of learning and mimicking, the definition of common objectives able to clearly 
define the European social model (Vandenbroucke, 2002: 535). Thus, the Minister helped 
to diffuse orientations about solutions (not only problems). 
 
                                                 
9  Four issues were at the centre of that scientific efforts  : pensions, employment, intergenerational 
solidarity, family and care policies, and procedural aspects of the renewed European framework. Oxford 
University press published a book edited by G. Esping-Andersen in 2002 (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002).   13
Other countries worked for the emergence of the Pensions OMC. As argued by the former 
‘attaché social’ of the Permanent Representation of Italy to the European Union (and 
confirmed by civil servants of DG Employment), the Italian bureaucracy acted as a 
promoter of a coalition of countries favourable to the introduction of the OMC on 
pensions: 
 
“(...) We (the Italian representatives) used a typical diplomatic strategy to build 
alliances, in particular with France and Belgium. Belgium was represented by the 
Minister Vandenbrouke, while France had a strong bureaucratic structure, 
represented by Raoul Briet who then became the first president of the Social 
Protection Committee.” (Interview with the then Italian ‘attaché social’ in 2000, 
Berlin, 9 May 2005). 
 
The bilateral contacts between the Jospin Governement (and the Minister for Social 
Affairs, Martine Aubry in particular) and the Italian Government (and his Minister for 
Employment and Social Affairs, Antonio Bassolino) prepared the ground for the respective 
bureaucracies. Yet, the active role of the administrative elite, was not the result of a 
specific impetus by the Italian politicians. Again, the former ‘attaché social’ of the 
Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU clarify that point: 
 
‘political leaders did follow our activism (...) there was not a real strategy, also 
because the (Italian) legislature ended in 2001 and politicians had other interests 
at that time’(Interview with the then Italian ‘attaché social’ in 2000, Berlin, 
9 May 2005). 
 
The Italian administrative élite acted to play a role in the emerging process well beyond the 
political mandate given by their political counterpart. Why did Italy work for the launch of 
Pensions OMC? A member of the Indicators sub-group of the Social Protection 
Committee, clearly exemplifies the reason for this activism: 
 
“for Italy, the OMC represented the opportunity to put pensions on the EU 
agenda with a twofold aim: on the one hand, that of presenting progresses 
implemented through reforms in the 1990s; on the other, to develop a debate on 
present and future problems still to deal with”. (Interview, member of the SPC 
Indicators sub-group, Brussels, 5 April 2005). 
 
At that time, the Italian reform of 1995 could be considered a good practice to ‘promote’ at 
the European level. It consisted in a progressive containment of total public spending 
through the innovation of some of the pensions system rules (e.g. the benefit structure). 
Then, the reform was implemented in parallel with a process of monitoring of total 
spending, and of the functioning of the system through a new administrative body (Unit for 
the Evaluation of pension spending). That unit had the aim to produce projections and 
technical expertise (e.g. definition of indicators, etc.) in order to develop an in-depth 
exchange of information for the analysis and the assessment of the long-term evolution of 
public pensions. Such an approach (consistent with the method of co-ordination in 
progress) was absent in the other members. What is more, the new legislation was 
concerted by the government and trade unions representatives (Natali and Rhodes, 2004). 
As confirmed by the then representative of Italy to the EU on social issues: 
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‘(…) we were convinced to have a pension reform that could be a model for the 
other members (…) and in fact at the Stockholm Council the Italian and Swedish 
reforms both represented the benchmark for the other members.’ (Interview with 
the then Italian ‘attaché social’ in 2000, Berlin, 9 May 2005). 
 
Yet, in other social policy sectors Italy was a late comer, more than a good practice (see 
Ferrera, 1997; Ferrera and Sacchi, 2005). This further explains the interest of Italy to work 
for the launch of Pensions OMC. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study of the events between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21
st century 
has helped us to assess the interaction of a number of variables. These produced the right 
conditions for the emergence of a (not so large) window of opportunity that some political 
entrepreneurs used to launch a new mode of governance in the pension field. 
 
The multi-dimensional and multi-level framework we have proposed has allowed to map 
multiple socio-economic, political, and institutional factors that favoured that window. 
While socio-economic pressures (reinforced by European integration) were consistent with 
a more direct EU intervention; institutional and political factors were more inconsistent. 
From an institutional point of view, the European integration represented a source of 
strains on national pensions, a limit to member states’ capacity to find solutions, and a 
parallel pressure for more demands of supra-national coordination. New governing modes 
in the economic and employment field represented a template for the development of 
similar forms of co-ordination on social issues as well. But, the persistent strength and 
diversity of national pension institutions led to the opposite: the strict respect of 
subsidiarity. 
The influence of political events at the time was ambiguous. The vast majority of left-of-
centre governments at the end of the 1990s did favour and use the resurgence interest for 
the social dimension of Europe. Yet, they were not enthusiastic about more advanced 
forms of coordination. And I think electoral incentives related to national pension 
programmes help understand the reason for this. 
 
In such a political context, some political entrepreneurs were able to create and spread 
some key strategic orientations on the ‘pensions problem’ and its solution. The Director 
general of the DG on Employment and Social Affairs and the Belgian Minister competent 
on these matters, both contributed to define a problem (financial strains on pension systems 
and its inability to deal with new risks), propose a solution (‘new’ mode of governance at 
the EU level), and arrange the political consensus for the emergence of a new institution. 
The Italian administrative elite contributed to commit and organise key resources in terms 
of consensus and technical expertise (as a consequence of its reforms of the early 1990s). 
Finally, the paper has shed some light on the peculiarities of the OMC emerged in pensions 
policy through the combination of different theoretical approaches. 
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